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RECENT CASES
It appears that the near impossibility of defining a standard to
measure degrees of culpability would result at times in an apportion-
ment based on nothing more than the mere conjecture of the jury.
27
Moreover, by permitting one joint tortfeasor to secure several judg-
ments, the plaintiff is necessarily deprived of the opportunity to
obtain a joint judgment. As a consequence he is assured compensa-
tion for his injuries only if all the tortfeasors were solvent. The con-
cept of a "joint tort" has considerably changed since the enactment
of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.040, and the underlying
purpose of this provision-the modification of the harshness of the
joint judgment-could now be served by the existing right of con-
tribution. By either repealing this statute, or by enacting legislation
basing recovery in an action of contribution on disparities of fault,
the legislature could alleviate the existing inconsistency in the two
methods of effecting loss distribution among joint tortfeasors.28 Such
action seems necessary in view of the increasing amount of litiga-
tion involving multiple collisions.
Jackson W. White
TORTS-PROXIVATE CAUSE-LIABILITY OF VENDOR OF INTOXICATING
LIQUORS TO TAIRD PERSONS.- Plaintiff, as administratrix of one whose
death was caused by collision with a car negligently driven by an
intoxicated minor, brought action for damages against four tavern
keepers for wrongful death and, in her capacity as owner, for dam-
ages to the car driven by decedent. She alleged that the four de-
fendants negligently and in violation of statute sold liquor to the
minor when he was intoxicated. The trial court granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that these
injuries were too remote to have been promimately caused by the
sale of the liquor. Held: Reversed. The decedent was within the
class which the statute was designed to protect. By prohibiting liquor
sales to minors and intoxicated persons, the legislature intended to pro-
tect the general public as well as these buyers. As to proximate cause,
he would be assessed with a greater share of the damages, might enter a com-
promise to avoid this consequence.
27 For an interesting case on jury apportionment see Beasley v. Evan's Adm'x,
311 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1958), in which the court reversed a jury verdict of
$15,000 against a non-resident tortfeasor and $642.44 against a local defendant.
See also Legis., 49 Harv. L. Rev. 312, 318 (1935).2 8 Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, and South Dakota have enacted legislation
basing contribution on relative degrees of fault: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1001 to
1009 (1947); Del. Ann. Code, titl. 10 § 6301-08 (1953); Hawaii Revised Laws
§ 10-16 (1955); S.D. Code, § 33.04A01-.04A10 (Supp. 1952). See also Gregory,
Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions 145 (1936).
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the vendors should have foreseen the unreasonable risk of harm to
the traveling public created by the illegal sale and the subsequent
negligent acts of the vendee. Rappaport v. Nichols, 81 N.J. 188, 156
A.2d 1 (1959).
Liquor Vendors' Common Law Liability-Majority View
The mere sale of liquor to an able-bodied man was never an
actionable wrong at common law.' Generally, statutes now prohibit
sales to minors, intoxicated persons, habitual drunkards, 2 and certain
other classes; 3 however, civil recovery for any injuries caused by
violation of these penal statutes has consistently been denied.4 The
lone exception is Riden v. Gremm5 where a wife recovered for her
husband's death caused by liquor sold to him by the defendant in
violation of a penal statute prohibiting sale to habitual drunkards
after written notice to stop was given the defendant. The only other
instances where civil action was permitted pertained to injuries to
one's slaves, who were not considered sui juris.6
'The two most commonly cited authorities for this proposition are Cruse
v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889):
It was not a tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating
liquor to "a strong and able-bodied man," and it can be said safely
that it is not anywhere laid down in the books that such act was
ever held at common law to be culpable negligence that would
impose legal liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of such
liquor.
and Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564, 565 (1939):
The common law gave no remedy for the sale of liquor either on the
theory that it was a direct wrong or on the ground that it was
negligence, which would impose a legal liability on the seller
for damages resulting from intoxication.
For the development of the common law theory see 15 R.C.L. Intoxicating
Liquors § 7 (1917); cf. Britton's Adm'r v. Samuels, 143 Ky. 129, 136 S.W. 153
(1911).
2See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 244.080 (1959) (hereinafter referred to as
KRS).3 Kentucky also prohibits sales to "anyone known to the seller to have been
convicted of any misdemeanor attributable directly or indirectly to the use of
alcoholic beverages, or of a felony." KRS § 244.080. South Dakota also restricts
sales to anyone whom the vendee has received written notice from authorities
or relatives not to serve; any spendthrift insane or feeble-minded person; or
anyone known to be the object of charity: S. DaZ. Code § 5.0226 (1939). See
Am. Jur. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 235-247 (1958).4 King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am. Rep. 119 (1886); Hitson v. Dwyer,
61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943); Britton's Adm'r v. Samuels, 143
Ky. 129, 136 S.W. 143 (1911); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774
(1939); Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936). This remains
the rule even in states with civil damage laws. Rogers v. Dwight, 145 F.Supp.
537 (E.D.Wis. 1956); Busser v. Noble, 22 IMI. App.2d 433, 161 N.E.2d 150
(1959).
5 97 Tenn. 220, 26 S.W. 1097 (1896); but see Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176
Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (1940).
6The vendor has been held liable for the value of a slave who dies from
exposure because of intoxication if this intoxication was the probable conse-
quence of the illegal sale. Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440 (1859); Harrison
v. Berkley, 1 Strob. 525, 47 Am. Dec. 578 (S.C.C.E. 1847). A slave was con-
sidered incapable of giving legal consent, especially insofar as anything prejudicial
[Vol. 48,
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The vendor's civil "immunity" has been based firmly on the
proposition that the act of drinking, rather than the wrongful sale,
was the proximate cause of injuries to the drinker or to a third
party.7 Contributory negligence through voluntary consumption of
liquor has been the second defense against actions for injuries to the
drinker."
Wrongful sales of a reckless nature have produced unreliable
exceptions9 to the common-law non-liability rule where the vendee
was an habitual drunkard intoxicated beyond volition,10 or where
the sale was accompanied by another tortious act,:" or made to an
alcoholic over the protests of his spouse.1
2
Under the last execption, the courts of Arizona and South Dakota
have granted the spouse an action for loss of consortium through
the use of an analogy to the common-law liability of a vendor or
habit-forming drugs under similar circumstances.' 3 They theorized
that the vendee's addiction caused the sale to merge with the drink-
ing to form the proximate cause of the injury to the marital relation.14
to his master's property, including himself, was concerned, 15 R.C.L. Intoxicating
Liquors § 7 (1917).
7 This type of reasoning is common:
[ilt has been held by all courts and by every commentator that the
proximate cause ...of the resultant effects arising from voluntary
intoxication is the act of the drinker, and not the act of the seller
. .. The principle is epitomized in the truism that there may be sales
without intoxication, but no intoxication without drinking.
Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125, 127 (1945). See also Wailer's
Adm'r v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3, 137 S.W. 766 (1911); Seibel v. Leach, 233
Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
8 King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am. Rep. 119 (1886); Bissell v. Starzinger,
112 Iowa 266, 83 N.W. 1065 (1900); Hoyt v. Tilton, 81 N.H. 477, 128 Aft.
688 (1925). See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1152, 1155 (1957).
9 Some sort of reckless or wanton conduct must be alleged to have accom-
panied the illegal sale or these exceptions will not apply. For example, in King
v. Henkie, supra note 8, an action was dismissed where the illegal sale was to a
hopelessly intoxicated drunk who died almost immediately from the whiskey.
10McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168, 48 Am. Rep. 260 (1883), where against
protests of bystanders defendant gave an excessive amount of whiskey to a
habitual drunk in order to collect a bet.
11See Dunlap v. Wagner, 85 Ind. 529 (1882) (vendor liable where put
drunken vendee on wagon behind horse after illegal sale); Nally v. Blandford,
291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1954)
(host liable for guest's death where gave her liquor until she was in helpless
condition and then abandoned her).
12Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Swanson v. Ball, 67
S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940).
13 Ibid. For the common-law liability of a vendor of habit-forming drugs,
see Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202 (N.Y. 1867); Holleman v. Harward, 119 N.C.
150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 58 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E.
102 (1912).
14 As the South Dakota court stated:
[UIndependent of any specific statute the wife has a cause of action
against anyone wrongfully interfering with the marital relationship
regardless of the agency or instrumentality employed to inflict the loss.
Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482, 483 (1940).
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The courts reasoned that, as in the case of drugs, habitual use of
liquor destroys the inebriate's judgment in reference to its use; there-
fore, the sale merges with the consumption as the sole voluntary
act in the chain of causation. 15 The spouse of an alcoholic should be
able to rely on this theory.16 However, the Restatement Torts'7 does
not support it, and no jurisdiction other than Arizona and South
Dakota has utilized it.18
Liquor Vendors' Liability Under Dram Shop Acts
In order to insure compensation to injured parties by placing the
enormous expense of injuries caused by liquor19 on the drinking pub
lic, 20 many states21 have adopted dram shop acts, 22 which give in-
jured third parties the right to recover where the common law gave
none. The contexts of these acts vary,23 but they generally provide
for liability of liquor vendors to any person who sustains injury to
person or property or loss of suport caused by, or in the consequence
of, the resulting intoxication. 24 The problem of establishing proximate
cause has been greatly reduced 25 as a result of the liberal interpre-
15 For an explanation of this analogy see Case Note, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev.
91 (1940) and Case Note, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 180 (1955). Note that this is a com-
mon law theory even though civil actions for the wrongful sale of habit-forming
drugs and liquor are usually granted at least to the husband by statute. Re-
statement, Torts § 696, comment a and special note (1938). Note also that this
is not the common law action for loss of consortium for injuries caused by
negligence of a third party, which is generally granted to husbands but usually
denied to wives. See La Face v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry. 249 S.W. 534 (Ky.
1952) (wifes action dismissed); Prosser, Torts § 104 (2d ed. 1955); Restate-
ment, Torts § 693 (1938). See also Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal.
2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
16See dissenting opinion in Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 457
(1955) and Case Note, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1940).
17 "The expression 'habit-forming drugs' as used in this section does not
include intoxicating liquor." Restatement, Torts § 696, comment c (1938).
18 The only other support found for the "merger" theory is dictum in Hoyt
v. Tilton, 81 N.H. 477, 128 AUt. 688 (1925).19 See 1959 National Safety Council Accident Facts 49; Note, 42 Iowa L.
Rev. 38 & n.4 (1956).
20 The vendor buys liquor law liability insurance and the premium cost
is paid by his customers in increased prices.
21 See 4 S.D.L. Rev. 149 n. 3 (1959) for the latest listing of states which
have dram shop acts. There are now twenty.22 Dram shop acts are often referred to as civil damage acts. Technically
the latter provide only for civil action against vendors in certain cases, whereas
the former also have other provisions pertaining to the regulation of tavern sales.23 Probably the most liberal remedial provisions are found in the Illinois
act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, § 135 (1959), discussed at length in 1958 U. Ill.
L.F. 175, 219, 249 and Note, 51 N.W. U.L. Rev. 775 (1957). Compare the
more restrictive New York statute N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 16 (1959), discussed
in Note, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 252 (1957).
2430 Am. Jur. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 540-42 (1958); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d
923 (1959).
25 For instance, in Beers v. Walhizer, 50 Sup. Ct. (43 Hun.) 254 (N.Y.),
aff'd, 53 N.Y. 63 (1887), recovery for injury to means of support was granted
where plaintiff's husband was sentenced to life imprisonment for shooting an-
other while under the influence of defendant's liquor. See also Pierce v. Albanese,
[Vol. 48,
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tation the acts have received because of their wording and remedial
nature.26 The dram shop acts have created liability unknown to
common law. Furthermore, their existence has caused jurisdictions
lacking dram shop acts continually to hold that any extension of liquor
vendors' liability is for the legislature since that procedure alone has
been used in other states.
27
Liquor Vendors' Common Law Liability-Minority View
New Jersey has had no civil damage act since 1934,28 but recovery
was granted in the principal case by application of two recent hold-
ings, 29 common-law negligence principles, and the policy arguments
supporting the adoption of dram shop acts. These three decisions
may represent a trend away from the non-liability rule. Schelin v.
Goldberg,30 decided after the repeal of Pennsylvania's civil damage
act, upheld a common-law action by an intoxicated vendee for in-
juries received from an assault by another patron whom the plain-
tiff bad offended. The illegal sale was held to be the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries notwithstanding his contributory negligence.
The court reasoned:
[The liquor control act] making it unlawful to sell, furnish or give
any liquor to any person visibly intoxicated was enacted to protect
society generally, but to protect specifically intoxicated persons
"from their inability to exercise self-protective care."
3 1
144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957); Hill v. Alexander. 321 Ill. App. 627, 53
N.E.2d 307 (1942).2 6 "The [civil damage] act is remedial in character and should be con-
strued to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." Iszler v. Jorda, 80
N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D. 1957). Furthermore, it is generally provided that since
these statutes are remedial they should be liberally interpreted. See e.g. Ill.,
Rev. Stat. ch. 43, § 94 (1959); R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-1-5 (1957).
271n State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951), the
court reasoned that since legislatures have always had control over the liquor
trade the absence of a civil damage law expresses the legislative intent as clearly
as atln'mative legislation would. See also Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 .P.2d
450 (1955); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939). Courts in
states with dram shop acts use the same reasoning in refusing to allow actions
in situations not covered by the acts. Cowman v. Hansen, 92 N.W.2d 682
(Iowa 1958); Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. 552, 40 N.W.2d 362 (1949).
283 Vernier, American Family Laws § 158, at 92 (1st ed. 1935) lists thirty
states with some form of civil damage acts, but this oft-cited list is out of date.
Several states, including New Jersey and Kentucky, repealed these laws when
they repealed their prohibition legislation. See footnote 21 supra.
29Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959);
Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
30 Supra note 29.
3' 146 A.2d at 652. Restatement, Torts § 483 (1938) provides:
If the defendant's negligence consists in the violation of a statute
enacted to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise
self-protective care, a member of such class is not barred from re-
covering for bodily harm caused by the violation of such statute.
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In Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store,3 2 the defendant
sold liquor to an intoxicated driver in Illinois who killed the plain-
tiff's husband in Michigan. The federal court granted recovery even
though the provisions for civil damage action of the dram shop acts
of both states do not apply extra-territorially. In effect, it held that
the violation of the Illinois penal statute prohibiting sales to in-
toxicated persons33 subjects a vendor of these illegal sales to liability
for the acts of his vendee upon third persons in Michigan. This
holding is unique in three respects. (1) A mere illegal sale subjects
the vendor to liability for acts of the vendee caused by the intoxi-
cation. Only the Riden case in 189634 and the Schelin case in 1958 3
had previously adopted this rule. (2) The violation of an Illinois
penal statute is sufficient grounds for a civil action under Michigan
common law. However, the Illinois court has since construed the'
statute to be insufficient grounds for a civil action.36 (3) A liquor
sale to an intoxicated person is not a sale to an "able-bodied man."
This definition of an "able-bodied man" amounts in fact to a restric-
tion of the common law non-liability rule.3 7 Oddly enough the pri-
mary reason given for creation of the common law liability was that
to deny extraterritorial effect to one Illinois Act would "leave a
vacuum in the law."
38
In the principal case, the New Jersey court recognized these
precedents, found the plaintiff to be within the class protected by
the statute prohibiting liquor sales to minors and intoxicated persons,39
and held the defendants negligent for creating an unreasonable risk
of harm to the traveling public. It stated:
When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor
or to an intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not
only to the minor or the intoxicated person but also to members
of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen;
this is particularly evident in current times when traveling by car
to and from the tavern is so commonplace and accidents resulting
from drinking are so frequent. [Emphasis added.]
40
32 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
33 Ie. ev. Stat. ch. 43, §131 (1959) only forbids sales to intoxicated persons
while § 135 provides for the civil damage action.34 Riden v. Gremm, 97 Tenn. 220, 86 S.W. 1097 (1896).
35 Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
36 Busser v. Noble, 22 Ill. App.2d 433, 161 N.E.2d 150 (1959). Recovery
is usually granted only where the state of enactment has construed the penal
statute to create a standard of care upon which a civil action could be base
37 See quotation from Cruse v. Aden in note 1 supra.
38 269 F.2d at 824.
39 "It seems clear that these broadly expressed restrictions [of the New
Jersey penal statute] were not narrowly intended to benefit the minors and
intoxicatd persons alone but were wisely intended for the protection of members
of the general public as well." 156 A.2d at 8.
40 156 A.2d at 8.
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To establish proximate cause the court employed the negligence prin-
ciple that intervening causes, such as the vendee's negligence, which
are foreseeable or are normal incidents of the risk involved, will not
relieve the original torifeasor of liability.41 The court further strength-
ened its position by an analogy to the liability of one who illegally
furnishes a minor with firearms or air rifles.42 It then limited liability
to licensed vendors who should know that the vendee is a minor or
an intoxicated person likely to be operating a motor vehicle.
Liquor Vendors" Liability in Kentucky
Kentucky's sixty-year-old limited dram shop act43 was repealed
in 1934.44 Under that statute a right of action was provided only to
the inebriate's relatives, and then only if the vendor had received
written notice to stop selling to the inebriate.45 In every common-
law action, the Kentucky court has refused to hold that an illegal
sale is the proximate cause of resulting injuries. Two 1911 hold-
ings which did not concern the dram shop law still represent
the Kentucky law and also continue to influence other common-law
jurisdictions. Britton's Adnr v. Samuels" dismissed an action for the
wrongful death of an intoxicated vendee caused by defendant's
liquor because "the unlawful or wrongful act was the sale of the
liquor, but death was produced, not by the sale, but by the drinking
thereof by the deceased."47 However, the court's dictum recognized
that the action would have been granted if it had been alleged that
the sale had been made for the intentional purpose of injuring the
vendee.
48
Waller's Adm'r v. Collinsworth49 dismissed an action against
an unlicensed vendor for the wrongful death of an nitoxicated vendee
who was killed by another vendee, an intoxicated minor. The court
said the unlawful sale was not the proximate cause of the killing but
41 Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4 N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950); Prosser, Torts
§ 49 (2d ed. 1955); See also strong dissenting opinions in Cole v. Rush, 45
Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955) and Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.App.2d
246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
42 Semeniuk v. Chentis, 1 Ill.App.2d 508, 117 N.E.2d 883 (1954).
43 Ky. Acts 1893, ch. 182. A licensed tavern keeper who furnished or allowed
an inebriate to drink on his premises was subject to a civil action for damages by
the wife, father, mother or child or the inebriate.44 Ky. Acts 1934, ch. 146.
45 For an outline of recovery under the Kentucky dram shop act see Keyser
v. Damron, 159 Ky. 444, 167 S.W. 381 (1914).
46 143 Ky. 129, 136 S.W. 143 (1911).
47 Id. at 132, 136 S.W. at 144.
48 This dictum is within the exception to the common law non-liability rule
where the sale is accompanied by another tortious act. See note 11 supra.
49 144 Ky. 3, 137 S.W. 766, (1911).
19601
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only "produced a condition of mind out of which the killing might
have resulted."50
Nally v. Blandford51 followed the dictum of Britton's Adm'r and
upheld a complaint in a wrongful death action which alleged that
defendant vendor sold an excessive quantity of whiskey to the dece-
dent for the purpose of injuring him. The vendor was further charged
with knowledge that decedent intended to drink enough to win a
bet and that decendent could not be safely trusted with the whiskey.
However, the holding was clearly within the exception to the non-
liability rule, for recovery was granted solely because the illegal
sale was accompanied by an intentional tort.
52
The 1960 session of the General Assembly failed to adopt a pro-
posed general dram shop law.
53
Conclusion
If a liquor vendor sells liquor to a minor or intoxicated driver
who later, because of his intoxication, injures another traveler, the
vendor should be liable. The non-liability rule was developed long
before the emergence of the danger imposed by the intoxicated
driver. If legislatures lag, the courts could employ general principles
of negligence to extend liability of liquor vendors. The majority of
jurisdictions, including Kentucky, hold that the lender of a car to a
known drinker is liable for injuries to third persons due to borrow-
er's intoxication even if the borrower is sober at the time he is given
the car.54 The unreasonable risk of harm created by the negligent
loan of the car is the same risk as that created by the illegal sale of
liquor. The sober borrower may later be the intoxicated vendee.
Even if they are different persons the foreseeability of the negligent
acts of the intoxicated or vendee is clearly more probable than those
of the sober borrower. Therefore, justice and consistency would re-
quire that the two contributors to the risk be held to the same degree
of liability should the risk materialize.
Whayne C. Priest, Jr.
50 Id. at 6, 137 S.W. at 767.
51291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
52 See notes 11 and 48 supra. This decision has been criticized on the ground
that the facts fail to support an intentional tort in Comment, 46 Ky. L.J. 176
(1957).
53 H.B. 257, S. 131, Reg. Sess. (1960).
54 V. L. Nicholson Construction Co. v. Lane, 177 Tenn. 440, 150 S.W.2d
1069 (1941); 5 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, § 2927 (1954); 60
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 431, at 1062-63 (1949). Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1364, 1375
(1947), See Brady v. B & B Ice Co., 242 Ky. 138, 45 S.W.2d 1051 (1931),
where recovery was denied for failure to show defendant lendor's knowledge
of lendee's habits. See also dissenting opinion in Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.
App.2d 246, 210 P.2d 530, 535 (1949).
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